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SUBJECT: Integration in South Kivu Moving Slowly

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Integration in South Kivu continues to be hampered by logistical problems and the FRF's decision not to participate in the process. MONUC is optimistic (perhaps overly) that it can overcome the logistical issues and that lead negotiator Malu Malu will be able to persuade the FRF to join integration. UNPOL is working with the Congolese National Police to train 3,500 newly integrated police (former CNDP) in North Kivu. In addition, MONUC hopes, in the next several months, to begin deployment of 1,500 Rapid Intervention Police, primarily in the Kivus, but also in Haut-Uele. End summary.

Logistical problems

¶2. (SBU) Integration of armed groups into the FARDC has been on-going for two months, but progress has been slow, particularly in South Kivu, due to logistical issues. At present, there are only two integration centers open in the province at Luberizi and Kalehe. Some combatants are reportedly waiting for the other centers, located closer to their home communities, to open before integrating. MONUC will soon open a center at Baraka, followed by Kamombo (Haut-Plateau), Mwenga, and Kindu. IOM, according to MONUC, can quickly and efficiently build and maintain the centers, but MONUC can only provide security for three centers at one time, hence the sequencing (Comment: This does not explain why MONUC has been slow in opening the third center at Baraka. End comment.)

¶3. (SBU) The two functioning centers have been full for weeks, turning away people who arrive. Ex-combatants who qualified for accelerated integration have already been processed, as have most of those opting for DDR or community reintegration. However, the vast majority of those arriving are only eligible for brassage, but since the brassage centers do not offer food, the ex-combatants are reluctant to enter the process. Father Apollinaire Malu Malu, the lead negotiator in the Kivus, noted that the Amani program is responsible for food, but, because the necessary financial controls are not in place, the funds cannot be transferred (Comment: This is possible, but it is also possible that Malu Malu is stalling because there are no funds. End comment.) A proposed solution is to turn Luberizi into a brassage center, complete with financial controls, so it can handle all ex-combatants in South Kivu.

FRF still holding out

¶4. (SBU) The FRF has still not agreed to integration, but Malu Malu is confident the group will eventually sign up. Mai Mai Yakutumba, probably the most serious South Kivu armed group after the FRF, now claims it will not integrate until the FRF does and until the GDRC presents a credible strategy to deal with the FDLR (Comment: If Mai Mai Yakutumba sticks to this position, the group will ultimately be reneging on its commitments under the March 23 agreement. Publicly, the group will most likely get back in line, but, in reality, it is unlikely that the group will integrate all its troops and weapons absent FRF participation. End comment.)

Newly integrated police

¶15. (SBU) UNPOL is developing a plan with General Numbi, head of the Congolese National Police to train 3,500 newly integrated police officers (former CNDP) in North Kivu. UNPOL maintains the training will include "rigorous screening" for human rights violations. The training will cost \$600,000, which the UK Government may provide.

Rapid Intervention Police

¶16. (SBU) MONUC has received funding from the German Government to support the deployment of 1,500 Rapid Intervention Police (PIR) in eastern DRC. The force will be primarily based in the Kivus, but some will go to Haut-Uele to relieve FARDC troops, who then should be able to focus on anti-LRA operations. The Rutshuru-Ishasha axis and the Sake-Masisi axis, with large FDLR presence, will be the priority deployments. Operational planning has started in Kinshasa, but actual PIR deployments will most likely be in several months.

¶17. (SBU) Comment: MONUC continues to be upbeat about South Kivu integration, but the logistical problems are unlikely to be resolved quickly or effectively. Integration of the FRF remains critically important for success. Success will ultimately depend on engineering a shift in FRF attitudes by playing on a range of hopes, anxieties and divisions within the movement. If the FRF does not join up, it is likely that other groups will also opt to hesitate. Given this dynamic, as well as logistical problems and the complicating backdrop of Kimia II, there is a genuine risk that the

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process will bog down. End comment.

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